Enlargement versus deepening: the trade-off facing economic unions. by Lorz, Oliver & Willmann, Gerald
Enlargement versus Deepening:
The Trade-oﬀ Facing Economic Unions
Oliver Lorz
Gerald Willmann
Vives discussion paper 2
November 2008
VIVES
Naamsestraat 69 bus 3510
3000 Leuven - Belgium
Tel: +32 16 32 66 61
www.econ.kuleuven.be/vivesEnlargement versus Deepening:







This paper analyzes the relationship between the size of an economic
union and the degree of policy centralization. We consider a politi-
cal economy setting in which elected representatives bargain over the
degree of centralization within the union. In our model strategic del-
egation aﬀects the identity of the representatives and hence the equi-
librium policy outcome. We show that the relationship between the
size of the union and centralization may be non-monotonic: Up to a
certain size enlargement leads to deeper integration, whereas beyond
that size further enlargement implies less centralization. We also show
that freezing the level of centralization and associate memberships can
mitigate the trade-oﬀ.
JEL classiﬁcation: D78, H77, H87.
Keywords: Fiscal Federalism, Policy Centralization, Political Econ-
omy.
∗RWTH Aachen University, Faculty of Business and Economics, Templergraben 64,
52056 Aachen, Germany, phone: ++49 241 80 93 93 1, fax: 80 6 93 93 1, email: lorz@rwth-
aachen.de.
†Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Department of Economics, Naamsestraat 69,
3000 Leuven, Belgium, phone: ++32 16 32 67 90, fax: 32 67 32, email: ger-
ald.willmann@econ.kuleuven.be
‡We would like to thank Ansgar Belke, Emily Blanchard, Hartmut Egger, Steﬀen
Minter, Stefan Napel, Otto Reich and seminar participants at the Ifo Political Econ-
omy Workshop, the VfS-AWTP, and IIPF annual meetings, at Massey University, and the
universities of Bayreuth, Tuebingen, and Virginia. The usual disclaimer applies: all errors
are ours.1 Introduction
The recent rounds of enlargement of the European Union have highlighted
the tension that may exist between the size and the scope of an international
union. This topic has featured prominently in the European public debate
for many years, and the common perception seems to be that of a trade-oﬀ
between widening and deepening the union. Some observers are skeptical of
further enlargement because they fear that it will hinder deeper integration
or even endanger the level of cooperation already achieved. Others favor
enlargement precisely because it is perceived as rendering further political
centralization more diﬃcult.
In a seminal paper Alesina et al. (2005) analyze the relationship be-
tween size and scope of unions and identify a trade-oﬀ based on the in-
crease in heterogeneity between member countries as the union increases in
size.1 This clearly plays an important role in the European context, as recent
new members in the East tend to be poorer than and structurally diﬀerent
from existing member states. However, the public debate also stresses the
sheer increase in the number of member states—even without any change
in heterogeneity—as potentially aggravating problems of political decision
making. In this paper, we analyze this second aspect focusing on the role of
strategic delegation.
In our model legislators bargain over which policies to centralize and
about how to share the costs of centralized policies. Voters have an incentive
to delegate representation to citizens who beneﬁt less from policy centraliza-
tion in order to improve the bargaining position of their own country and
to obtain a favorable cost-share vis-` a-vis other member states. Using this
setup, we derive the eﬀects of changing the number of member states in the
union. This exercise enables us to analyze the relationship between the size
of an economic union and its depth in terms of political integration.
We identify two countervailing eﬀects which inﬂuence the degree of pol-
icy centralization: On the one hand, for a given set of representatives, the
surplus from policy centralization increases with the number of countries,
since more countries beneﬁt from internalized policy spill-overs. Based on
this eﬀect alone, we should therefore observe more policy centralization as
the economic union becomes larger. On the other hand, the size of the union
also aﬀects the incentives for strategic delegation: as a union incorporates
more member states, the incentive to strategically delegate increase such that
voters tend to elect politicians who are less prone to centralization. If the
1Lockwood (2002) sets up a legislative bargaining model that explains as to why cen-
tralized policies may be insensitive to heterogeneous local policy preferences.
1second eﬀect dominates, there exists a trade-oﬀ between the size of an eco-
nomic union and the extent of policy centralization within the union. Using
numerical methods, we show that the relationship between size and depth
of a union may be non-monotonic: For a large range of parameter values we
obtain a hump-shaped pattern: As long as the number of member states is
small, an enlarged union also entails deeper integration in terms of policy
centralization. Beyond a certain number of countries, however, the opposite
happens and political centralization decreases as the union grows. Robust-
ness checks show how the extent of centralization costs and the relative ease
of side-payments aﬀect the relationship between the number of countries and
the degree of cooperation.
Our results have politically relevant normative and positive implications.
From a normative viewpoint, the question as to the optimal size of an eco-
nomic union arises. Our model simulations show how welfare changes with
an increase in the number of countries—in the political economy equilibrium
as well as in our normative benchmark, the utilitarian optimum. We show
that the welfare gap between these two allocations widens as the union grows.
The beneﬁts of enlarging an economic union are hence lower and, by conse-
quence, the optimal size of the union is smaller than in the absence of the
strategic delegation eﬀect.
On the positive side, existing member states of an economic union may
try to fend oﬀ potentially detrimental eﬀects of enlargement on the degree of
centralization by ﬁnding some institutional arrangements. For example, they
may invest sunk institutional costs into the extent of integration before they
accept new members, or they may try to ﬁx the existing extent of cooperation
constitutionally to prevent a roll-back after an enlargement. There is also
the possibility of diﬀerent degrees of integration:2 For example, new members
may be integrated into the union only as associated countries that do not
participate in policy centralization.
Our paper builds on earlier work on strategic delegation in economic
unions.3 Persson and Tabellini (1992) analyze tax competition between two
member states of an economic union. In their model voters can reduce the
intensity of tax competition by delegating decisions on tax rates to represen-
tatives with a stronger preference for public spending.4 Besley and Coate
(2003) ﬁnd an incentive for strategic delegation arising from a common pool
eﬀect: Citizens elect representatives with a strong preference for public goods
2See Schneider (2007) on a “discriminatory membership” and also Alesina et al. (2005).
3For recent surveys on the political economy of economic unions see Ruta (2005) and
Lockwood (2006).
4Janeba and Wilson (2005) endogenize the degree of centralization in a tax-competition
model without strategic delegation.
2in order to increase the local provision of local public goods, which are as-
sumed to be ﬁnanced from general taxation. Centralized policy making may
then result in an overprovision of local public goods compared to the prefer-
ences of the median voter.5
Redoano and Scharf (2004) and Lorz and Willmann (2005) analyze the
inﬂuence of strategic delegation on the centralization decision itself. In Re-
doano and Scharf (2004) two heterogeneous regions decide on the common
supply of a public good. The preference for the public good may either be
weak or strong. Voters in the region with the strong preference can facilitate
consensus with the weak-preference region on centralizing the public good
by electing a weak-preference representative. Lorz and Willmann (2005)
consider a continuum of public goods. Elected representatives bargain over
policy centralization and the regional contributions necessary to ﬁnance the
costs of public goods. Strategic delegation then results in too few policies
being centralized.6 Both Redoano and Scharf (2004) and Lorz and Will-
mann (2005) are limited to the case of only two regions. This paper extends
the analysis to a multi-region framework, thereby allowing us to explore the
relationship between the number of member states and the degree of central-
ization in an economic union.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
the model of policy centralization. In Section 3 we derive the political equi-
librium. Section 4 provides the numerical simulations on the relationship
between the size of the economic union and the degree of policy centraliza-
tion, section 5 examines possible institutional implications of our model for
alternative modes of enlargement, and section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we develop a political economy model that builds on Lorz and
Willmann (2005). In contrast to our earlier work with 2-country unions, this
paper considers economic unions that can consist of an arbitrary number n of
symmetric countries. This generalization allows us to address the interaction
between the number of member countries and the degree of policy centraliza-
tion. As in our earlier paper, we assume a continuum of local public goods
5On strategic delegation with respect to local public good provision see also Chari et al.
(1997), Cheikbossian (2000), Ferretti and Perotti (2002), and Dur and Roelfsema (2005).
6Related papers dealing with strategic delegation in a bargaining context are Segen-
dorﬀ (1998), Buchholz et al. (2005), Facchini et al. (2006), Rota Graziosi (2006), and
Harstad (2007, 2008a, and 2008b). Another related strand of literature is that of strategic
information transmission (see e.g. Olofsg˚ ard 2005). None of these papers, however, deals
with the issue of policy centralization.
3diﬀering in the extent of positive spill-overs to other countries, measured by
the term β. In particular, β is assumed to be distributed uniformly over the
unit interval.
Each country is inhabited by a continuum of citizens who diﬀer in their
individual preference for local public goods. The preference intensity is cap-
tured by the parameter α ∈ [αmin,αmax]. The utility of individual α in
country i takes the form:







β lngj(β)]dβ , (1)
where c is the consumption of a private good, g(β) is a local public good with
spill-over β, and j is the index for the other member states of the economic
union. As Alesina et al. (2005) we assume that only member countries of
the union send and receive spill-overs. Individual income y is assumed to
be exogenously given, unit costs of transforming private income into public
goods are normalized to 1, and governments can raise non-distortionary taxes
to ﬁnance public goods. For expositional convenience, we also assume the
average preference ¯ α to be equal to the preference α of the median citizen.
Under this weak symmetry assumption,7 the utilitarian optimum and the
ﬁrst-best solution from the perspective of the median voter coincide.
The provision of each public good can be decided either by a central gov-
ernment or decentrally. Under decentralized decision-making national gov-
ernments set the quantity of public goods non-cooperatively. They ignore the
spill-over to the other member states of the union. Assuming that national
governments maximize aggregate welfare of their jurisdiction, we can derive
the quantity of a local public good in a decentralized setting as:
g
d
i (β) = ¯ α ∀ β ∈ [0,1] and i = 1...n . (2)
Under centralized decision making, a common government sets the level of
the public good in each country to maximize aggregate welfare of the whole
union. Note that centralized decision-making does not imply a uniform pro-
vision level, only that the (possibly diﬀerent) provision levels in each country
are decided centrally. The public good levels under centralized decision-
making are then given by:
g
c
i(β) = ¯ α[1 + (n − 1)β] ∀ β ∈ [0,1] and i = 1...n . (3)
Comparing (2) with (3) shows that a central government supplies a larger
quantity of the public good than a national government. The reason is
7It is straight-forward to relax this assumption.
4that only the central government internalizes the positive spill-overs between
member states. The higher the spill-over β the higher is the supplied level
of the public good under centralization.
Due to the internalization of spill-overs, the member states of the union
can beneﬁt from centralizing the decision on public good supply. At the same
time, however, policy centralization entails costs: The disadvantages of pol-
icy centralization discussed in the literature include information asymmetries
with regard to local conditions, lack of interjurisdictional competition, the
distance between subjects and decision-makers resulting in less democratic
accountability, and ﬁnally the additional administrative costs at the center,
because centralization of policies—at least in the European context—hardly
ever leads to the down-sizing of local administrations. We model these costs
of centralization in a reduced-form, straightforward way by assuming addi-
tional ﬁxed costs f > 0 for each public good that has its provision decision
taken by the central decision-maker, and an over-head cost h(n) for the op-
eration of the union as a whole. Note that the latter does not inﬂuence the
centralization decision.8
Given these beneﬁts and costs of centralization, we deﬁne a “centraliza-
tion surplus” for public good β as the diﬀerence in utility between the cen-
trally decided provision level and the nationally decided level net of the ﬁxed
centralization cost. The preceding equations yield a centralization surplus
for citizen α of:
s(α,β) ≡ α[1 + (n − 1)β]ln(1 + (n − 1)β) − ¯ α(n − 1)β − f . (4)
In this expression, the ﬁrst term represents the beneﬁts of a higher provision
level, the second term the costs of the higher public good supply, and the last
term the ﬁxed cost of centralization. According to equation (4), the central-
ization surplus increases not only in the spill-over parameter β, but also in
the preference for public spending, α. A citizen with a strong preference for
public goods beneﬁts more from centralization than a citizen with a weaker
preference for public goods.
From a normative, utilitarian viewpoint, the optimal allocation of decision
powers centralizes all public goods with a positive surplus for the average
citizen. As the surplus increases in the spill-over β, we can determine a
critical threshold ˜ β∗, which is implicitly given by s(¯ α, ˜ β∗) = 0. The provision
levels of all public goods with higher spill-overs than ˜ β∗ should be decided at
the center by a central government whereas all public goods with a spill-over
below ˜ β∗ should remain under the authority of national governments. With
8It only guarantees a ﬁnite welfare optimum later on in the paper where we assume
these over-head cost to take the form h(n) = δnǫ.
5β being distributed uniformly, the diﬀerence 1− ˜ β∗ can be interpreted as the
optimal degree of centralization.
Implicit diﬀerentiation of s(¯ α, ˜ β∗) = 0 gives the inﬂuence of the number






< 0 . (5)
The optimal cut-oﬀ ˜ β∗ declines or, in other words, the optimal degree of
centralization increases in n. The more member states participate in the
economic union, the more countries can beneﬁt from the public good spill-
overs and therefore, the more attractive policy centralization becomes.9
After studying the optimal degree of centralization, let us emphasize that
we view the normative outcome solely as a reference point. In what follows,
we develop a political economy model that will provide a positive explanation
of the degree of centralization. That is, we investigate how the political
process determines the equilibrium cut-oﬀ level ˜ β.
3 Equilibrium Degree of Centralization
This section analyzes the centralization decision employing a political econ-
omy framework with the following three-stage structure: In the ﬁrst stage,
citizens in each country elect their national representative by majority vote.
All elected representatives then bargain over centralization in the second
stage of the model. The representatives jointly determine the extent of po-
litical cooperation and decide on how to share the cost of centrally decided
policies. In the third stage, the quantities of the local public goods are set—
at the center or at the national level—depending on the allocation of decision
powers.
We solve the model by backward induction: In the last stage policy-
makers decide public good levels by allocating national funds to maximize
the aggregate welfare of their respective jurisdictions. No delegation eﬀects,
agency problems, or other reasons for policy deviations from the welfare max-
imizing benchmark are considered at this stage, and the equilibrium public
good levels are given by equations (2) and (3), respectively. We maintain
this—admittedly somewhat optimistic—assumption in order to focus on the
centralization decision taken in the two previous stages of the game.
9Note that we are abstracting from country diﬀerences and in particular from core-
periphery considerations. Otherwise, the spill-over term β would also depend on the size






Figure 1: Centralization Decision and Public Good Levels
In the second stage the allocation of decision powers is decided, tak-
ing as given the identities of the national representatives α
rep
i . The elected
representatives jointly decide the centralization threshold ˜ β, and in doing
so ultimately determine the public good levels set subsequently. This de-
cision and its implication for the provision of public goods is depicted in
ﬁgure 1. In addition, the elected representatives also determine redistribu-
tive side-payments between member states Zi (i = 1...n). By including
side-payments we allow for the possibility that the costs of centralized poli-
cies are not shared uniformly. Instead, by negotiating side-payments, the
representatives eﬀectively bargain over how to share these costs. In order to



























= 0 . (7)
The quadratic term in the budget constraint is meant to capture eﬃciency
costs of inter-regional transfer payments or it represents the political cost of
unevenly sharing the ﬁnancial burden of centralization. The term γ ≥ 0
determines the extent of these additional costs. For γ = 0 all transfers occur
lump-sum; a strictly positive γ represents potential distortionary costs of
international transfers, which increase in γ. By changing γ, we can analyze in
a continuous fashion how the availability of interregional transfers inﬂuences
our results.10 The quadratic speciﬁcation is chosen for tractability.
The equilibrium policy maximizes the Nash-product in (6) subject to the
constraint from (7). The resulting ﬁrst order condition for the equilibrium
side-payments Ze












+ λ(1 + γZ
e
i ) = 0 ∀i , (8)
























 = 0 , (9)
where λ is the Lagrangean multiplier and the superscript e stands for the
equilibrium. Including the budget constraint, we thus have n + 2 equations
that determine the n + 2 unknowns {Ze
1,Ze
2,...,Ze
n}, ˜ βe, and λ.
In what follows, we consider only symmetric equilibria in which the iden-
tity of the representative α
rep
i is identical for all countries; that is, we can
drop the index i and simply write αrep. Furthermore, in any symmetric equi-
librium all Ze
i must clearly be zero. As the surplus from centralization is the
same for all representatives, no side-payments are necessary to redistribute
between member states. It is worth emphasizing that we do not assume them
to be zero, only that costs are shared evenly in any symmetric equilibrium.11
10Facchini et al. (2006) and Harstad (2007 and 2008a) compare the limit cases of free
transfers versus prohibitive transfer costs.
11The mere possibility of side-payments, however, inﬂuences the outcome because it
provides an incentive for strategic delegation.










1 + (n − 1) ˜ β
e
 
− ¯ α(n − 1) ˜ β
e − f = 0 . (10)
The identity of the elected representatives thus determines the degree of
centralization. The stronger the preference for public spending among the
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− ¯ α(n − 1)
< 0 , (11)
where the second-order condition implies that the denominator is positive.
Given the solution of the second stage, we are now in a position to analyze
the ﬁrst stage of our model, the election of national representatives. We
do this by analyzing the voting-decision of the decisive median voter. The
median citizen in country i with preference ¯ α for public spending chooses
α
rep
i to maximize her utility imputation, i.e. her indirect utility taking into
account the second and third stage consequences that we derived above:
Vi(¯ α, ) = y + Z
e
i + ¯ α
  1
0




where ˜ βe and Ze are given by equations (8) and (9). The ﬁrst order condition
of this optimization problem is given by dVi/dα
rep












= 0 . (12)
From (8) and (9) the marginal eﬀects of choosing a higher α
rep
i on the equi-
librium degree of centralization and on the equilibrium side-payments can be
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< 0 . (14)
9Noting the signs in (13) and (14), equation (12) can only be satisﬁed if
s(¯ α, ˜ βe) > 0. The fact that the centralization surplus of the average citizen
is positive at ˜ βe implies that ˜ βe > ˜ β∗. Hence the degree of centralization
is ineﬃciently low in the political economy equilibrium.12 The reason for
this ineﬃciency result is a strategic delegation eﬀect: Voters are aware that
the identity of the elected national representative inﬂuences the bargaining
outcome. Speciﬁcally, as the equilibrium side-payment Zi decreases in α
rep
i ,
the median voter of country i has an incentive to choose a representative
with a weaker preference for public spending than herself in order to receive a
positive side-payment from the other countries. In the symmetric equilibrium
all elected representatives then have a weaker preference for public goods than
the median or average citizen, and the resulting degree of centralization is
too low. Commemorating the British rebate and who obtained it, one might
call this the “Thatcher” eﬀect.
4 Enlargement vs. Deepening
This section analyzes how strategic delegation and the degree of centraliza-
tion change with the number of member states in the union. The starting
point for our analysis is the equilibrium condition (12). From (10) we can
determine αrep as a function of ˜ βe. Diﬀerentiating (10) yields ∂si( )/∂α
rep
i
and ∂si( )/∂˜ βe. Inserting into (12), solving for the integral and employing
the symmetry property of the equilibrium, we can determine the equilibrium
degree of centralization ˜ βe as a function of n. As this expression is not suited
for a straightforward comparative-static exercise, we resort to numerical sim-
ulations in the following.
In our benchmark simulations we set ¯ α = 3 , f = 0.5 and γ = 0.5. Fig-
ure 2 shows how the size of the union aﬀects strategic delegation. It plots
αrep relative to ¯ α in the range n ∈ [2,20]. As we can see from this ﬁgure,
strategic delegation increases in the number of countries, and the represen-
tative’s identity αrep deviates further and further away from the median’s
identity ¯ α as the size of the union increases. The more countries bargain
over centralization, the lower is the inﬂuence of a single representative on
the equilibrium ˜ βe. The marginal costs of strategic delegation—in terms of
sub-optimal centralization—decline from the view of a single country, and
this eﬀect gives voters a stronger incentive to deviate from their own public
good preferences when choosing a representative.
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Figure 2: Strategic Delegation and the Number of Member States
With respect to the equilibrium degree of centralization 1 − ˜ βe, we thus
have two eﬀects working in opposite directions: On the one hand, the cen-
tralization surplus increases for given α
rep
i as more countries can beneﬁt from
the public good spill-over if n increases. On the other hand, α
rep
i declines
in n. Figure 3 depicts the resulting degree of centralization in the political
economy equilibrium and compares it to the normative benchmark. We see
that the gap between the optimum and the equilibrium policy widens as the
number of member states increases. Given our numerical speciﬁcation, we
obtain a hump-shaped pattern for the equilibrium degree of centralization.
The union ﬁrst becomes more integrated as the number of member states
rises and then—in our example for n ≥ 5—the equilibrium centralization
level declines in n. That is, eventually strategic motives cause a trade-oﬀ
between further enlargement and a deepening of the union.
The numerical nature of our results calls for robustness checks. To see
how the distortionary cost of interregional transfers aﬀects the above results,
ﬁgure 4 varies γ from 0.0 to 1.0. A high γ weakens the incentives for strategic
delegation as interregional transfers become more costly. The decline in αrep
is less pronounced if γ increases. As ﬁgure 4 shows, the equilibrium degree of
centralization then follows more closely the optimum. In fact, for γ = 1.0 the
level of centralization monotonically increases over the whole range between
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Figure 3: Centralization and the Number of Member States
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Figure 5: Low Fixed Centralization Costs
Figure 5 shows the inﬂuence of the centralization costs on the model’s
predictions. In this ﬁgure, we lower f compared to its benchmark value
to f = 0.1. Not surprisingly, the optimal degree of centralization is quite
high already at a low number of member countries. Consequently, the curve
representing the optimum is ﬂatter than in the benchmark case. Adding
strategic delegation to the picture then results in a maximum for the degree
of centralization already at n = 2. Conversely, for a higher f than in the
benchmark case, the maximum level of centralization shifts to the right.
Table 1 combines the inﬂuence of f and of γ on the equilibrium, reporting
the number of member states which maximizes the degree of centralization
for diﬀerent values of fand γ.
γ = 0.0 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.8
f=0.3 3 4 4
f=0.5 4 5 6
f=0.7 5 6 8
Table 1: Number of Member States for Maximum Centralization
From this table we see that a trade-oﬀ emerges for a comparatively small
number of member states if either the ﬁxed costs f or the redistribution
costs γ are low.
13Figure 6 depicts the welfare eﬀects of strategic delegation.13 In the ﬁgure
we compare the welfare of the average voter in the political economy equilib-
rium with the welfare in the utilitarian optimum—for the moment disregard
the middle curve that we return to discuss in the next section. We see that as
the number of member countries n rises, the welfare level in the political equi-
librium increasingly falls short of the optimal level. In other words, the larger
the political union becomes, the higher is the welfare loss due to strategic
delegation. We also see from the diagram that there is an optimal size of the
union that maximizes the aggregate welfare of each member state. Strategic
delegation inﬂuences this optimal union size. Whereas the welfare of each
member is maximized at 32 member countries in our numerical example if
the optimal degree of centralization is chosen, the welfare maximizing size of
the union declines to 24 countries in the political economy equilibrium. The
detrimental political eﬀects stemming from strategic delegation thus reduce
the optimal size of an economic union.
5 Alternative Modes of Enlargement
The negative welfare eﬀect of enlarging the union beyond a certain size is
due to ever more conservative representatives coming to power because of
strategic delegation. This raises the question whether there exist safeguards
or alternative forms of enlargement that avoid this problem in the political
arena. Clearly, the question of constitutional design takes us one step further
than the positive theory developed so far.
Consider an economic union of a certain size which decides about entry of
new members. In order to prevent a roll-back of centralization, the existing
members may try to preserve the status-quo degree of centralization before
they take in new member states. This can be achieved, for example, by means
of constitutional treaties—the treaties of Rome, Maastricht, and Lisbon are
cases in point. The eﬀects of such an institutional “ratchet” mechanism
are depicted in Figure 6. In constructing this ﬁgure we assume that the
centralization level ﬁrst grows gradually with the size of the union, but once
it reaches the maximum it stays at that level as the union grows further. As
Figure 6 shows, such a rule raises the optimal size of the union compared to
the benchmark case. The reason for this is that beyond the maximum level
of centralization the institutional “ratchet” eﬀect prevents the welfare loss
associated with the decline in centralization that would otherwise take eﬀect.
13We again use the numerical values assumed so far as well as δ = 0.002 and ǫ = 3 for
the overhead cost.
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Figure 6: Enlargement with “Ratchet” Eﬀect
A second strategy to prevent a decline in centralization is to admit ad-
ditional countries only as associated members of the union. An associated
country receives and provides spill-overs just like a full member state, but
it does not participate in policy centralization. Compared to granting full
membership, an associated membership keeps the degree of centralization of
the union that has been enlarged in such a way unchanged. An additional
advantage of an associated membership is that the membership costs are
presumably lower for an associated country than for a full member. These
potential beneﬁts of an associated membership have to be compared to the
disadvantage of not internalizing the spill-overs.
Figure 7 depicts the welfare gain from admitting a new member state as an
associated member, given that the union has n full members.14 With regard
to the membership cost, we consider h = h(n+s), where s ∈ [0,1] measures
the contribution of an associated member to the membership cost. If s
equals zero the associated member does not cause additional costs, whereas
s = 1 describes the (somewhat unrealistic) case that membership costs for
an associated member are as high as for a full member. We see from Figure
7 that the additional welfare from admitting an associated member may
be higher than from admitting an additional full member if the number of
member states is suﬃciently high (to the right of the intersection point). This
14Note that similar graphs can be drawn for admitting more than one associated mem-
ber.
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Figure 7: Enlargement and Associated Membership
is only the case, however, if we assume that membership costs are suﬃciently
lower for an associated member than for a full member. In Figure 7 we have
used s = 0.3, whereas the case s = 1.0 is represented by the dotted line.
Notice one interesting alternative interpretation of the result just derived:
Instead of viewing s < 1 (solely) as the result of the lower cost of an associated
membership, we can also interpret (part of) the diﬀerence as a membership
fee the associated country has to pay to the existing full members. This does
not reduce the actual cost, but it does reduce its eﬀect on the welfare of
existing members, as part of the cost is recovered in form of the dues paid
by the associated member. In practice, countries associated to the EU pay
contributions and this renders associated membership more attractive for the
incumbents as an alternative form of enlargement.
6 Concluding Remarks
The nexus between the size of an international union and the extent of coop-
eration between its members is an important aspect of international policy
coordination. In this paper, we set up a political economy model that al-
lows us to analyze this relationship. Our model features symmetric countries
with heterogeneous agents who strategically select national representatives.
These representatives then bargain over the extent of policy centralization,
and how much each member state should pay for centralized policies.
16We show that strategic delegation gives rise to representatives with a
low preference for public spending, and how this adverse political eﬀect be-
comes worse as the number of member countries increases. The strategic
delegation eﬀect of union enlargement counteracts and eventually dominates
the increasing potential for the internalization of spill-overs. As a result, a
hump-shaped pattern between the size of the union and the degree of policy
centralization may emerge; that is, beyond a certain size we face a trade-oﬀ
between further enlargement and deeper integration.
Our results complement the earlier work by Alesina et al. (2005) who
analyze the role of an increase in heterogeneity between asymmetric member
states if the union grows larger. We consider symmetric countries but propose
a model of the political process in which an increase in union size aggravates
ineﬃciencies in political decision making. Both hypotheses feature promi-
nently in the public debate on further EU enlargement. Understanding and
addressing both seems to be of utmost importance for European integration
to continue.
We also discuss two extensions of our model: First, we let existing mem-
bers of the union ﬁx the degree of centralization at the status-quo level before
they let in new members. With such a “ratchet” mechanism in place, the
existing members of the union avoid a decline in the degree of centralization
which would otherwise result from enlargement. Second, we analyze an as-
sociated membership as an alternative to admitting additional full members.
An associated member country sends and receives spill-overs just as a full
member, but does not participate in the centralization of public goods. Both
possibilities can mitigate the trade-oﬀ between enlargement and deepening
of an economic union, however, in the case of an associated membership at
the cost of not internalizing spill-overs with these countries.
As for future work we can extend our model to include asymmetric coun-
tries in order to analyze the interplay between the size of a union, the hetero-
geneity of its member countries and the incentives for strategic delegation in
one uniﬁed framework. For example, spill-overs could decline with distance
so that countries located at the core send and receive more spill-overs than
countries at the periphery. A growing union then becomes increasingly het-
erogeneous with respect to the preferred level of centralization. This aspect is
partly captured by our assumed overhead cost. A second promising avenue is
to develop a genuinely dynamic model of centralization and union expansion
which treats enlargement as a sequential process. Such a sequential model
will allow us to analyze the strategic interaction between decisions taken at
diﬀerent points in time. Furthermore, old member countries and new en-
trants then diﬀer with respect to their fall back option when it comes to
enlargement.
17Appendix
This appendix derives the marginal eﬀects of α
rep
i on Ze
i and ˜ βe holding all
α
rep
j (j  = i) constant. As we depart from the symmetric equilibrium, we can
summarize all countries j  = i by a representative country −i.
With si = s(α
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the ﬁrst order conditions for
Zi and Z−i can be written as:
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From these two equations we can eliminate λ:
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Combining (A.1) with (A.2) leads to:
(1 + γZ
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e






  ˜ s
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−i = 0 . (A.3)
In addition, the budget constraint has to be satisﬁed:
Z
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 2 . (A.4)
Equations (A.1), (A.3) and (A.4) determine the three unknowns, Ze
i , Ze
−i
and ˜ βe. Totally diﬀerentiating these three equations, setting dα
rep
−i = 0, and
18employing the symmetry properties Ze
i = Ze
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i = 0 , (A.6)
dZ
e
i + (n − 1)dZ
e
−i = 0 . (A.7)
From (A.6)–(A.7) we can derive equations (13) and (14) of the text.
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